We estimate the impact of natural disasters on financial development proxied by private credit. We employ a panel fixed effects estimator as our main estimation tool on a country level panel data set of natural disasters and other economic indicators covering 147 countries for the period from 1979 to 2011. We find that companies and households get deeper into debt after a natural disaster. This effect is stronger in poorer countries whilst the effect is weaker in countries where agriculture is more important. Accordingly, it appears that natural disasters significantly increase contemporaneous private per capita credit. This impact is mitigated by higher per capita income and further dampened by higher agriculture dependency in the economy. Our findings are robust to alternative estimators, specifications, and samples.
Introduction
Natural disasters are inherently destructive, disruptive and costly in the short run, and may hamper economic growth too. Vice versa, poorer countries, and particularly financially underdeveloped countries are more vulnerable to natural disasters. This paper contributes to the study of the nexus of disasters and growth by estimating the impact of natural disasters on financial development.
The literature on the impact of natural disasters on economic growth is as yet inconclusive.
Natural disasters are seen as a major impediment for global development efforts (UNISDR, 2002 ) and the resolution dated 18 February 2009 adopted by the United Nations General
Assembly stresses the fact that the impacts of natural disasters heavily hinder the achievement of internationally agreed development targets. Although natural disasters are considered as negative for growth in general (Felbermayr & Gröschl, 2014; Raddatz, 2007; Strobl, 2012) , some literature suggest a positive correlation between natural disaster frequencies and economic growth (Albala-Bertrand, 1993; Dacy & Kunreuther, 1969; Skidmore & Toya, 2002) .
The level of financial development plays a key role. Specifically, in the recuperation subsequent to a disaster, it is necessary to have quick and unconstrained access to finances for immediate and smooth recovery. If the recovery investments bring in better and advanced technology, it not only ensures the speedy recovery but also paves the way for a higher economic growth. Insurance claims, own savings, aid and grants from the government and third parties, third party investments and indebtedness are the means to meet this financial need.
There is a higher propensity to save in disaster vulnerable countries like Japan (Skidmore, 2001 ). As Tol and Leek (1999) point out required finances can be acquired through assistance (credit or aid), savings or insurance. In reducing economic damages caused by disasters, a strong financial sector is therefore important (Toya & Skidmore, 2007) . As Gignoux and Menéndez (2016) highlight, it is possible to reconstitute publicly and privately owned infrastructure capital if there are well-functioning financial markets. If finances are readily available, it facilitates the speedy recovery which in turn enhances the development and regaining of the pre-disaster economic growth.
Countries with higher levels of domestic credit better able to withstand and endure natural disasters without affecting their economic output much (Noy, 2009) . McDermott, Barry, and Tol (2014) find that natural disasters have a significant negative contemporaneous impact on economic growth which is mitigated by higher credit.
This raises the question whether natural disasters also affect financial development of an economy. Klomp (2014) highlights that natural disasters increase the likelihood of banks' default. Apart from this piece of work, which focuses on bank Z-scores and not on financial development per se, we do not find any other study in the existing literature which explores the impact of natural disasters on financial development.
Accordingly, in this paper we explore whether there is any impact of natural disasters on financial development proxied by credit, if so in which direction and in what magnitude and how it depends on other economic factors. At a broader level, financial development can be defined as the improvement in the quality of five key financial functions: (1) producing and processing information about possible investments and allocating capital based on these assessments; (2) monitoring individuals and firms and exerting corporate governance after allocating capital; (3) facilitating the trading, diversification, and management of risk; (4) mobilizing and pooling savings; and (5) easing the exchange of goods, services, and financial instruments (Čihák, Demirgüč-Kunt, Feyen, & Levine, 2013, p. 9) . Čihák et al. (2013) highlight level of access to, depth, efficiency and stability of financial institutions and markets. They present a 4x2 matrix of financial system characteristics and compile panel data which can be used as proxies for financial development. However, credit availability to the real sector by domestic banks as a percentage of GDP is used most in the literature. Its wide data coverage, and the vital role played by private credit may be the reasons for this.
Empirical Analysis

Data
The source of natural disaster data for this study is EM-DAT, the International Disaster Database maintained by the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) at the Université Catholique de Louvain in Brussels, Belgium (Guha-Sapir et al., 2014) . The EM-DAT database contains inter-alia data on world-wide natural disasters occurred since 1900.
Over 13,000 natural disaster events occurred in about 220 countries from 1900 to 2014 are reported in the database. As per the database, from 1979 to 2011, the period on which the instant study is focused for the reasons of data quality and availability, over 10,000 natural disaster events have occurred in 219 countries affecting more than six billion people.
EM-DAT classifies natural disasters into sub-groups, namely, biological, climatic, hydrological, geophysical, meteorological and extraterrestrial disasters. Each natural disaster sub-group contains data on relevant types and sub-types of natural disaster events.
For a natural disaster to enter into the EM-DAT database, at least one of the setout criteria needs to be fulfilled, i.e., reported death toll of 10 or more, 100 people reported affected, a call for international assistance or the declaration of state of emergency. As highlighted by Miao and Popp (2014) , these are arbitrary thresholds. There is a tendency for national governments to exaggerate the disaster damage in reporting as a strategy for attracting external aid, especially in developing countries (Noy, 2009 ). Still, EM-DAT is the source of data that has been used widely in disaster literature.
The EM-DAT database contains disaster outcomes measured as the number of total deaths, number of people affected (injured, became homeless, displaced or affected otherwise) and the total monetary damage caused by a disaster. The economic data may be gathered by the individuals who attend the affected area primarily with the intention of providing medical care and physical aid. Therefore, they may lack the expertise to estimate of the economic loss. Of the numbers of people killed and affected, the preferred variable is the number of people affected. In some instances, even a severe disaster may not kill as shown by Gassebner, Keck, and Teh (2010) , Cavallo and Noy (2011) and Klomp (2014) . Hence, in this study, the number of people affected by natural disasters in a country year is chosen as the variable of interest.
Following Noy (2009) , the disaster variable is normalized as the "percentage of population affected". There are 2,712 country-years with at least one disaster. On average, disasters affect 3.6% of the population in a country-year and the maximum percentage of population affected by natural disasters in a single country-year surpasses 150%. Hydrological disasters are the most common natural disaster. However, climatic disasters affect the highest percentage of population, with meteorological disasters next in line.
The number of people affected by a disaster depends on the nature of the disaster as well as on the underlying socio-economic status and disaster management strategies of the affected economy, leading to endogeneity in models that quantify the economic impact of natural disasters (Kellenberg & Mobarak, 2008; McDermott et al., 2014; Sen, 1983; Tol & Leek, 1999) . In order to reduce the endogeneity problem, while Noy (2009) and Klomp (2014) develop a count disaster measure, McDermott et al. (2014) construct a binary disaster variable imposing a threshold of 0.5 percent on the fraction of population affected to capture only the relatively severe disasters in the model. As a robustness check, McDermott et al. (2014) carry out their analysis using a binary disaster variable constructed without imposing any such threshold. They admit the fact that the binary variable reduces the variation of data and the explanatory power of the model. In spite of this they opt for a binary disaster variable as it reduces not only the influence of measurement error in disaster data on the analysis but also the possibility of results are being driven by outliers at the upper bound of the disaster data distribution. However, by doing this they equalize minor disaster events which affect a very few individuals with severe disaster events which affect hundreds of thousands of people.
Further, it can be argued that the imposition of an arbitrary threshold to segregate large disasters would cause biases in the estimates. Yet, it is not less common in disaster studies to adopt such decision rules to isolate severe disasters to include in the model. For instance, Becerra, Cavallo, and Noy (2014) and Klomp (2014) deploy such decision rules to limit their investigation to major disasters. Exploring disaster effects on bank solvency, Klomp (2014) limits his sample to 170 severe disasters which caused highest economic damage and the time period from 1997 to 2010 in quantifying the impact of natural disasters on bank Z score which reflects banks' distance to default.
Since there is a clear trade-off in using a binary disaster variable with or without a decision rule, the current analysis employs a continuous disaster variable, namely the percentage of population affected by natural disasters in a country year. Nevertheless, as a supportive identification strategy and a robustness check, the baseline model is run using a binary disaster variable with various thresholds to segregate severe disasters in constructing the disaster dummy, as more fully described later on, to see whether it derives consistent results.
This paper explores the impact of natural disasters on financial development. A widely used private credit measure is chosen to proxy financial development given its broad data coverage in space and time, although it only measures the depth of financial institutions. Political institutions play a vital role in disaster mitigation, which is at least to some extent a public good. Plumper and Neumayer (2010) argue that the polity2 variable from the Polity IV Project is the most appropriate and popular measure of a country's political regime. Polity2
indicates openness of a country's political institutions. In the Polity IV database, the democracy indicator (democ), which varies on an eleven-point scale (0-10), represents the institutionalized democracy of a state. It depends on 3 elements which cover the democratic rights of citizens and the constraints on the executive in exercising its powers. Similarly, the institutionalized autocracy indicator (autoc), also an eleven-point scale (0-10), measures the institutionalized authoritarianism of the regime of a country. These two scales democ and autoc do not share any contributor categories in common. The value of polity2 is obtained by subtracting the autocracy (autoc) from the democracy variable (democ). It ranges between +10 (strongly democratic) and -10 (strongly autocratic).
A country that heavily relies on agriculture, especially rainfed agriculture, can be expected to be particularly vulnerable to natural disasters, such as droughts, floods, and storms. Both the destruction of cultivations and livestock and the disruption of transport and trade would affect the demand for credit and creditworthiness. As such, agriculture share of the economy together with its interaction with disaster variable is included in the benchmark specification. 
Empirical Model
We employ a panel regression estimator with country and year fixed effects as the main estimation strategy in our analysis. Fixed effects estimator is chosen since country and year fixed effects control for time-invariant country heterogeneity and time-variant shocks that simultaneously affect all the countries, respectively. This reduces any potential endogeneity
issue. The Hausman test shows that the fixed effects estimator is preferred to the random effects estimator. Furthermore, country-fixed effects also arrest any selection biases which may arise due to over representation of poor countries in the disaster data distribution as a result of their higher vulnerability to disasters (McDermott et al., 2014 The disaster variable is interacted with per capita GDP. We expect that a higher income reduces the need for debt-financing the recovery, because of higher savings and greater insurance cover.
If so, the interaction term would be negative.
The share of agriculture in GDP and its interaction with disasters are included in the bench mark specification to capture the effect of economic structure beyond development. As a country's preparedness and management strategies for natural disasters depend on the political will and institutions of that country, we include polity2 as a control variable. Terms and are the country and year fixed effects, respectively; is the independently and identically distributed error term.
When using a longer panel, one has to be careful because non-stationarity might give rise to spurious results as suggested by Nelson and Plosser (1982) . As one can suspect a unit root in the credit data, we estimate the model using various approaches: levels, levels with lagged dependent variable, long averages, first differences, and first differences with first differences in the controls. The key results are robust.
To show our original results are not driven by outliers, we repeat our regressions removing alternatively and jointly observations at the lower and upper bounds of the credit distribution and at the upper bound of the disaster distribution.
For identification, we assume that disasters are exogenous to credit. Although borrowed money can be used to fund protection against natural disasters, the probability is remote that contemporaneous credit affects vulnerability to disasters as it takes a long time for credit to be converted into effective and defensive disaster impact preventive or mitigating projects. The disaster exogeneity assumption is adopted by other disaster papers including Noy (2009), Raddatz (2007) , Ramcharan (2007) and Skidmore and Toya (2002) . If the exogeneity assumption does not hold, then the best solution to avoid reverse causality would be to employ a valid instrument. However, it is extremely difficult to find such an instrument (Noy, 2009 ).
Following McDermott et al. (2014) we construct a binary disaster variable, using various thresholds. A binary variable is less subject to potential reverse causality. We do this as a robustness check, as with a continuous disaster variable as we can be more precise in quantifying disaster effect on private credit.
We check against omitted variable bias by adding more control variables, such as macro stability, magnitude of the government spending, foreign links, which can be expected to have an influence on per capita credit. The inclusion of additional control variables is done at different stages. Firstly, we add main control variables one by one to the baseline model and subsequent to each addition, an interaction term of that control with the disaster variable is included so that their impact on the baseline model can be observed clearly. These main control variables are inflation which controls for macroeconomic stability of the country, government expenditure as a percentage of GDP and the trade share which reflects the degree of trade openness. Secondly, we control for other factors which seem to either stimulate or hinder private credit in connection with disasters, by using simple variant models of the baseline specification. Accordingly, we control for financial sector regulation using CPIA (Country Policy and Institutional Assessment) financial sector rating, non-life insurance premia volume as a share of GDP, lending interest rate, share of resource rent (including rent received on coal, oil gas, iron ore and minerals such as gold, silver, copper, etc. but not including rent on forestry) within the GDP, and share of forestry rent as a percentage of GDP and net official assistance received as a percentage of gross national income.
Apart from the panel fixed effect regression, different estimators are used, namely, ordinary least squares (OLS), quantile regression, and system generalized method of moments (GMM);
see Arellano and Bond (1991) , Arellano and Bover (1995) , Blundell and Bond (1998) and Roodman (2009a and 2009b) .
We measure per capita credit and GDP constant 2005 US$ and so account for inflation. To control for differences in living standards we repeat the analysis using per capita credit and GDP measured in purchasing power parity (PPP) constant 2005 US dollars.
We further explore the impact of different categories of natural disasters on private credit and we also run our regression for different geographical regions.
Finally, we ascertain the impact of natural disasters on other measures which proxy for financial access, efficiency and stability.
Results
Results of the baseline model are given in Table 3 . We restrict attention to the marginal effect of natural disasters on private credit. Disasters show a significant positive effect on contemporaneous credit. However, this positive effect is dampened down by higher income. It appears that the disaster-agriculture interaction also yields a negative coefficient suggesting that the positive impact of disasters on credit is further mitigated by higher share of agriculture in the economy. However, as this interaction is significant only at the 10% level, we ignore it for the time being. It appears that when it comes to credit, low income countries gain more from disasters compared to their rich counterparts.
Robustness Checks
No Lagged Dependent Variable
We run the fixed effects estimator without the lagged dependent variable to address any concern about attenuation or Nickel bias. As above, we observe a positive effect of disasters on per capita private credit, which is moderated by disaster income interaction. These results hold also in the presence of control variables. See Table 5 . Explanatory power falls substantially in the absence of the lagged dependent variable, as apparent from the R 2 . 
Unit Root
Instead of using credit per capita in its level as the dependent variable, we use the first difference of credit per capita, again with a fixed effects estimator. In the base model, the lagged dependent variable is indistinguishable from unity. As shown in Table 6 , this yields results consistent with those above. As a next step, we take the first difference of the explanatory variables, except for the disaster variable and per capita income. Table 7 shows the results, again consistent with those above. 
Medium-Term Effects of Disasters on Credit
By averaging our annual data over five year and ten year periods, we ascertain the effect of disasters on credit in the medium-term. Results for the fixed effects panel estimator using five-year and ten-year averages are presented in Tables 8 and 9 , respectively. Tables 10-12 show the results, which are consistent with those above. 
Additional Controls
As a further robustness check, control variables are included. See Tables 13 and 14 . The addition of controls leads to consistent results and so does not invalidate the findings above.
When controlling for inflation, government expenditure, international trade, financial sector rating, non-life insurance, lending interest rate, resource rent and forestry rent, the results for the disaster variable and its interaction with income do not change. However, the variables of interest lose significance in the presence of foreign aid. This may well be because foreign aid increases in response to natural disasters. 
Alternative Estimators
We re-estimate the model using system GMM, ordinary least squares (OLS), and quantile regressions to test whether they yield consistent results.
Results of the baseline model using alternative estimation methods are presented in Table 15 .
The results are consistent across the alternative estimators. Quantile regression also yields consistent results at all percentiles; see Table 16 . 
Purchasing power parity
All results above use market exchange rates. This may be misleading as this unit of measurement does not accurately reflect standards of living. Therefore, we repeat our exercise using per capita credit and GDP measured in purchasing power parity (PPP) constant 2005 US$ by employing output-based real GDP data for the Penn World Tables Version 8.0. Table   17 shows the results, which are consistent with those above. 
Disaster Sub-Groups and Geographical Regions
The impact of all disasters is dominated by climatic and meteorological disasters (in EM-DAT's classification). See Table 18 . We run our baseline specification for different disaster sub-groups. As expected from the descriptive statistics, results for climatic disasters are very similar to the results for all disasters.
Our main findings also hold for biological and geophysical disasters. However, although we get the same signs above for the variables of interest for hydrological disasters, results are insignificant for hydrological and meteorological disasters. See Table 19 . See Tables 20 below and Table 2 in the Appendix. Notes: Annual data 1979-2011, except where lost due to lags. All models include a constant term, country and year fixed effects. Errors clustered at the country level. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Binary Disaster Variable
Following McDermott et al. (2014), we run our baseline fixed effects estimator using a binary disaster variable, which is zero for disasters that below a threshold and one for disasters above.
This restricts the variable of interest to the presence or absence of a disaster in a given country year, ignoring for the magnitude of the disaster. By doing this we reduce potential endogeneity, as it is unlikely that credit could control the occurrence of disasters. The binary disaster variable of course contains much less information than the continuous one.
We use different thresholds to identify severe disasters. The results are consistent results with the above with respect to the sign regardless of the threshold. Effects become significant for thresholds of 5.5 percent or higher. See Table 21 . Without the disaster-agriculture interaction, which is never significant, disasters and the income-disaster interaction are significant at a 1%
threshold. See Table 3 in the Appendix. Credit pc 0.999*** 1.000*** 0.999*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** (0 
Granger Causality
The use of binary variable does not completely rule out any potential feedback or reverse causality. We therefore test for Granger causality. We first restrict the sample to disasters in January because annual credit cannot have a large influence on the disasters already occurred in January. As a placebo test, we restrict the sample to disasters in December as their effect on annual credit has to be small. We repeat this exercise with disasters in the first two months of the year and the final two months of the year. We find insignificant results for the initial months of the year and significant ones for the year end, suggesting reverse causality. However, when we examine the effects of disasters by month, we see significant results only for the months of February and December. Annual credit cannot affect vulnerability to disasters at the start of the year, while a disaster at the end of the year cannot affect annual credit. We find both, that is bidirectional causality in Granger's sense of the word.
Alternative Measures of Financial Development
Private credit represents only the depth of financial institutions. Using our baseline model and the fixed effects estimator, we consider alternative indicators of financial development. We cannot use all measures suggested by Čihák et al. (2013) Thus, it is obvious that all the indicators of financial development would not give rise to consistent results in our model. Nevertheless, as apparent from Table 22 we find strongly consistent results for liquid assets to deposits and short term funding (%) which represents financial stability. This indicator is the ratio of the value of the liquid assets of banks which can be easily convertible to cash, to their total deposits and short term borrowings. Higher value for this ratio represents higher liquidity and financial stability as banks are in a position to meet their immediate financial obligations without trouble. As in the case for private credit, natural disasters significantly increase the liquidity of banks reflecting their ability to meet disaster affected parties' immediate need for finances. However, higher per capita income moderates this effect as it lessens the need for borrowing.
As apparent from Tables 23 -26 , some other financial indicators too yield consistent results at least with respect to the signs on the coefficients of the variables of interest. Table 23 contains regression results with respect to disaster variable and its interaction with income on other indicators which represent financial depth. Financial depth is not a financial function itself but a proxy to reflect the magnitude of overall services extended by the financial system (Čihák, Demirgüç-Kunt, Feyen, & Levine, 2012, p. 8) . Deposit money bank's assets as percentage of GDP (gfdd_di_02) appears to increase with contemporaneous disasters but decrease when income is high. This is obvious as credit disbursed by banks constitutes part of banks' assets.
Nonetheless, this is not true when it comes to assets of non-bank financial institutions (gfdd_di_03) that do not accept transferable (demand) deposits as apparent from negative sign on the disaster coefficient. Natural disasters seem to increase demand, time and saving deposits in deposit money banks and other financial institutions as a share of GDP (gfdd_di_08). This can be the case as banks can attract more deposits by offering a higher interest rate to finance their disaster related credit which can be offered at even higher rate to desperate parties at the receiving end. Volumes of life and non-life insurance premium (gfdd_di_09 and gfdd_di_10) are reduced by natural disasters. Insurers may be reluctant to accept risks in the presence of contemporaneous disasters. Further, it is to be noted that insurance penetration is lower in poor countries which are more prone to disasters. Stock market capitalization as represented by total value of all listed shares in a stock market exchange as a percentage of GDP (gfdd_dm_01) tends to decrease with natural disasters indicating adverse impact of such events on corporate sector. Nevertheless, increased total value of all traded shares in a stock market exchange as a percentage of GDP (gfdd_dm_02) due to natural disasters may be an indicator of shareholders' attempt to recover financial needs through disposal of shares, or reflect investors' worries about profits and dividends. Outstanding domestic private and public debt securities as a percentage to GDP (gfdd_dm_03 and gfdd_dm_04) significantly decrease with natural disasters and more so when the income is low. Bond holders may be resorting to early redemption to finance disaster recovery as and when needed. A puttable bond vests the right upon holder to force the issuer to repay the bond prematurely. Total value of outstanding international debt issues both public and private, as a share of GDP (gfdd_dm_07) would be likely to decline as the credit rating of a country rapidly deteriorate after a natural disaster.
When financial access is considered, number of bank accounts per 1,000 adults (gfdd_ai_01) and number of commercial bank branches per 100,000 adults (gfdd_ai_02) tend to rise in the presence of natural disasters (see Table 24 ). This reflects the positive response from both demand and supply side after a natural disaster as financial inclusion should be expanded to reach disaster recovery related financial requirements. In line with the impact of natural disasters on stock market as mentioned afore value of all traded shares outside of the largest ten traded companies as a share of total value of all traded shares in a stock market exchange (gfdd_am_01) tend to increase whilst value of listed shares outside of the ten largest companies to the total value of all listed shares (gfdd_am_02) tend to decrease with natural disasters owing to similar reasoning. Total amount of domestic non-financial corporate bonds and notes outstanding to total amount of domestic bonds and notes outstanding, both corporate and noncorporate (gfdd_am_03) seems to increase with disasters, maybe highlighting the active role played by the corporate sector over the non-corporate sector by raising liquid funds to finance disaster recoveries.
Regression results of indicators for financial efficiency are summarized in Table 25 . We observe an increase in the accounting value of bank's net interest revenue as a share of its average interest bearing assets (gfdd_ei_01), the difference between lending rate charge by banks on loans to the private sector and the deposit interest rate offered by commercial banks on deposits with three-month tenure (gfdd_ei_02) and bank's income that has been generated by non-interest related activities such as trading gains, fees, commissions and other operating income as a percentage of total income (gfdd_ei_03) because increased disaster related credit raises interest income, interest differential as well as fees, commission and other activity income including valuation and evaluation income. Operating expenses of a bank as a share of the all assets held (gfdd_ei_04) decreases as it can be assumed that banks operate with existing administrative resources in handling higher demand for disaster related credit whilst increased credit expands the asset base. Maybe for the same reason, commercial banks' aftertax net income to yearly averaged total assets (gfdd_ei_05) appears to decline. However, as natural disasters do not necessarily increase equity of banks in the manner they increase interest and other income, commercial banks' after-tax net income to yearly averaged equity (gfdd_ei_06) increases. Since this impact does not depend on income tax we observe a similar reaction with respect to commercial banks' pre-tax income to yearly averaged total assets (gfdd_ei_09) and commercial banks' pre-tax income to yearly average equity (gfdd_ei_10).
Total value of shares during the period divided by the average market capitalization for the period (gfdd_em_01) increases, maybe due to increased trading and reduced capitalization, as stated earlier.
When it comes to financial stability (see Table 26 ), bank Z-score which captures the distance to default of a country's commercial banking system (gfdd_si_01) decreases with disasters.
Following Klomp (2014) , we take the logarithm of this ratio of return-on-assets plus equityasset ratio to standard deviation of return-on-assets. Supporting his findings we also see that disasters reduce the likelihood of bank defaults strengthening financial system stability. Ratio of gross value of defaulting loans (repayments of interest and principal past due by 90 days or more) to gross loans (gfdd_si_02) also reduces with disasters characterising a healthy financial system. Ratio of bank capital and reserves to total financial and non-financial assets (gfdd_si_03) increases with natural disasters. It is puzzling as to why the financial resources provided to the private sector by domestic money banks as a share of total deposits (gfdd_si_04) decline when we observe an increase in the private credit. Maybe banks attracting more deposits than the disbursed credit as now they are in a position to offer a higher deposit interest rate. The ratio of total bank regulatory capital to its assets held, weighted according to risk of those assets (gfdd_si_05) increases with disasters. Again it is surprising that the provisions to non-performing loans (gfdd_si_07) increase in a scenario of observable decline in non-performing loans. It is rational to see an increase in stock price volatility i.e., the average of the 360-day volatility of the national stock market index as natural disasters unambiguously create an uncertainty in the stock market in the short run. -Deposit money banks' assets to GDP (%), gfdd_di_03 -Nonbank financial institutions' assets to GDP (%), gfdd_di_08 -Financial system deposits to GDP (%), gfdd_di_09 -Life insurance premium volume to GDP (%), gfdd_di_10 -Nonlife insurance premium volume to GDP (%),gfdd_dm_01 -Stock market capitalization to GDP (%), gfdd_dm_02 -Stock market total value traded to GDP (%), gfdd_dm_03 -Outstanding domestic private debt securities to GDP (%), gfdd_dm_04 -Outstanding domestic public debt securities to GDP (%), gfdd_dm_07 -International debt issues to GDP (%) Notes: Annual data 1979-2011, except where lost due to lags. All models include a constant term, country and year fixed effects. Errors clustered at the country level. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, gfdd_ei_01 -Bank net interest margin (%), gfdd_ei_02 -Bank lending-deposit spread, gfdd_ei_03 -Bank noninterest income to total income (%), gfdd_ei_04 -Bank overhead costs to total assets (%), gfdd_ei_05 -Bank return on assets (%, after tax), gfdd_ei_06 -Bank return on equity (%, after tax), gfdd_ei_09 -Bank return on assets (%, before tax), gfdd_ei_10 -Bank return on equity (%, before tax), gfdd_em_01 -Stock market turnover ratio (%) -Bank Z-score, gfdd_si_02 -Bank nonperforming loans to gross loans (%), gfdd_si_03 -Bank capital to total assets (%), gfdd_si_04 -Bank credit to bank deposits (%), gfdd_si_05 -Bank regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets (%), gfdd_si_06
-Liquid assets to deposits and short term funding (%), gfdd_si_07 -Provisions to nonperforming loans (%), gfdd_sm_01 -Stock price volatility
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Conclusion
This paper shows that natural disasters have a significant positive impact on financial development, more specifically on the per capita private credit disbursed by domestic banks.
This effect is dampened by higher per capita income. The positive impact of natural disasters on private credit is further mitigated by higher agricultural dependency of the economy. In other words, we find strong evidence that companies and households get deeper into debt after a natural disaster. This effect is stronger in poorer countries. We find some evidence that suggests that the effect is weaker in countries where agriculture is more important.
Nominal change in per capita credit due to an increase in the disaster measure diminishes with higher income. As the percentage of population affected by disasters increases, poor countries with lower per capita income will see an increase in their nominal per capita credit, however, rich countries with higher per capita income will experience a decline in their nominal per capita credit. Nevertheless, given that the magnitude of the per capita credit countries already enjoy differs considerably across countries irrespective of their per capita income, the disaster impact on credit is quantified by way of the percentage change in prevailing per capita credit.
When the disaster affected population increases by one percentage point countries like Burundi, Guinea, Madagascar and Afghanistan will see a substantial increase of 30-50 percent in their per capita credit. Meanwhile, countries like El Salvador, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Algeria and Venezuela will experience the highest decline in their per capita credit which varies from 1.5 -0.5 percent.
Our findings are robust to various checks. We get consistent results when we include controls which represent macroeconomic stability, government spending, and trade openness enhancing our baseline specification. Once we control for other relevant factors such as non-life insurance penetration, financial sector regulation, lending interest rate, resource rent and foreign aid while employing baseline model and its slight variants, we yet observe consistent results. Our findings are also robust to alternative estimators. We take various measures to rule out any potential endogeneity issue including the use of system GMM estimator and binary disaster variable. Furthermore, we consider alternative indicators of financial development, and find that, qualitatively, our results carry over.
Any research comes with caveats which should be explored in further analysis. Two stand out.
First, we use nationally aggregate data. Changes at the aggregate level are open to misinterpretation and may obscure the actual mechanisms. The analysis here should therefore be repeated with microdata. Second, we find that natural disasters affect financial development.
Earlier papers found that financial development affects vulnerability to natural disasters. Our analysis should therefore be repeated with a dynamic model of simultaneous equations. These issues are deferred to future research. 
